Date: 2021-10-03
First Name: Andrea
Last Name: Barreiro
Title: N/A
Organization: Math For Unbiased Maps TX (MUM_TX)
Address: 
City: DALLAS
State: TX
Zipcode: 
Phone: 
Affirm public info: I agree
Regarding: Congressional

Message:
I am making these comments on behalf of Math For Unbiased Maps TX (MUM_TX), an interdisciplinary, nonpartisan coalition of Texas mathematicians, political scientists and philosophers working to ensure a fair and transparent redistricting process. Our research concerns the development and application of ensemble sampling techniques, and in particular their application to the current TX redistricting cycle. In brief, we use Markov Chain Monte Carlo techniques to generate a large number of random, legally valid maps which can then be used as an unbiased baseline to understand what a typical map should look like. Conversely, when a proposed map is an outlier from the ensemble, this may be an indication of gerrymandering.

We applied our methods to the Congressional maps that have been made available by the Texas Legislative Council. As of 10/2/21, we had seen 11 maps posted: C2101, which was submitted by Sen. Huffman (R); C2102, C2103, C2104, C2105 and C2107, submitted by members of the public, and a series of amendments to C2101: 2108-2112. We generated a table of two important statistics that are commonly used by political scientists to assess partisan gerrymandering: the mean-median score and partisan bias score. You can find the full table at our webpage: http://www.smu.edu/Dedman/Research/Institutes-and-Centers/DCII/Scholarship/Research-Cluster-on-Political-Decision-Making/TXGerryWatch.

We have also performed more detailed analysis for C2101-C2105, which can be found in the linked PDF.

Unfortunately, our conclusion is not kind: every map submitted by legislators, beginning with C2101, is (1) egregiously gerrymandered to reduce the competitiveness of nearly every congressional district, and (2) manipulated to give the Republican Party, in particular, an outsized advantage, completely unlike any plan in our unbiased ensemble. The result is that nearly every district (both Republican AND Democratic) is uncompetitive in a general election, and that among these there are far too few Democratic districts, given the actual political leanings of Texan voters.

We illustrate this conclusion by analyzing C2101, which was proposed on 9/27/21. We compared the proposed map to an ensemble of 500,000 randomly-drawn maps. In our first figure, districts are ordered by the number of votes a Democratic candidate for US Congress would have received in the 2020 election, had voters used “straight ticket” voting. On average, maps within our ensemble (blue dots) exhibit smoothly increasing vote shares as one moves from Republican-leaning to Democratic-leaning districts. This smooth increase is the hallmark of an unbiased map. But in the proposed map (red dots), the increase is highly disjointed, a clear sign of gerrymandering.

We note several specific features of the proposed plan. First, Democratic voters are disproportionately removed
from a swath of districts in between 10 and 15 (District numbers are along the x-axis) that would be competitive in an unbiased map (a process known as “cracking”), and placed into uncompetitive districts such as 32, 20, 29, 35, 18, and 33 (a process known as “packing”). Second, the list of outcomes between Districts 2 and 3 (a total of 13 districts) is very nearly flat, which is a hallmark of maps created with the assistance of computer algorithms designed to automate the gerrymandering process. Finally, the predicted vote share between Districts 15 and 7 changes abruptly by about 20 points, with only 2 districts in between (28 and 34) -- this represents a “wall” designed to protect legislators from changing voter opinions over time.

We also compute two common numbers that political scientists use to “score” maps. The first such number is called the “mean-median” score: the difference in statewide vote percentage each party would need to win the majority of the chamber. For the proposed map, the Republican Party would need to win only 42.25% of the vote to win 19 seats, while the Democratic Party would need to earn 57.75%; the difference of these numbers gives a “mean-median” score of 15.5 (note: to get these numbers from the figure, scale up by a factor of 100). The second such score is called the “partisan bias” score: the difference in the number of seats each party wins if each were to earn 50% of the vote. For the proposed map, the Republican Party would win 24 seats with 50% of the vote, while the Democratic Party would win only 14 seats; the difference of these numbers gives a “partisan bias” score of –10. In contrast, the median map in our ensemble has a mean-median score of –2.2 and a partisan bias of 2 (when the statewide vote splits 50-50, the Republican Party wins 18 seats to the Democratic Party’s 20).

Of course, no plan is going to be perfectly aligned with the ensemble, so just how gerrymandered is this plan? A little? A lot? An extreme amount? This question can be answered using statistics, by comparing each score above to the distribution of those scores within the 500,000-map ensemble. This is done in the next figure below, and the results are disappointing. As shown in the following figure, both the “mean-median” and “partisan bias” scores are very far from their typical values within an unbiased ensemble. In fact, both the mean-median and the partisan bias scores were more extreme than any value we saw in our ensemble. Not a single map in our ensemble had a mean-median score as large as that of the proposed map, and not a single map had a partisan bias score as negative. This pattern is repeated in the amendments.

We next consider C2102, C2103, C2104, and C2105 which were submitted by members of the public. As such, we are skeptical that they will be seriously considered by the committee. That would be unfortunate: because while all five plans appear to have been constructed to benefit the Democratic Party, they are all less manipulated than C2101.

We distinguish C2107, in particular. While its MM and PB scores indicate the plan favors the Democratic Party more than the median ensemble member (-3.3 and 4 respectively), it is far less of an outlier than any of the legislator-introduced plans (with 20% of plans in the ensemble scoring “worse” -- i.e. more biased towards the Democratic Party -- on both scores). For context, the absolute largest mean-median value in our ensemble was 6.8, while the minimum partisan bias was –6; the scores for C2101, at 15.5 and –10 respectively, are completely off the scale.

In summary, the plans proposed by legislators, beginning with C2101, fail Texas voters by artificially reducing the competitiveness of nearly every legislative district. Furthermore they artificially inflate the advantage to the Republican Party, in comparison to a typical unbiased map; such a map is closely balanced between the parties (and far more reflective of the views of actual Texas voters, who voted 54% to 46% in the 2020 election). We urge legislators to go back to the drawing board and return with a map that is fair to Texas voters.
Math For Unbiased Maps TX (MUM_TX) is an interdisciplinary, nonpartisan coalition of Texas mathematicians, political scientists and philosophers working to ensure a fair and transparent redistricting process. Our research concerns the development and application of ensemble sampling techniques, and in particular their application to the current TX redistricting cycle. In brief, we use Markov Chain Monte Carlo techniques to generate a large number of random, legally valid maps which can then be used as an unbiased baseline to understand what a typical map should look like. Conversely, when a proposed map is an outlier from the ensemble, this may be an indication of gerrymandering.

We applied our methods to the Congressional maps that have been made available by the Texas Legislative Council. As of 9/30/21, we had seen 5 maps posted: C2101, which was submitted by Sen. Huffman (R), and C2102, C2103, C2104, and C2105, submitted by members of the public. We generated a table of two important statistics that are commonly used by political scientists to assess partisan gerrymandering: the mean-median score and partisan bias score. You can find the table at our webpage: www.smu.edu/Dedman/Research/Institutes-and-Centers/DCII/Scholarship/Research-Cluster-on-Political-Decision-Making/TXGerryWatch.

We have also performed more detailed analysis for these maps below.

We begin with C2101, which was proposed on 9/27/21. We compared the proposed map to an ensemble of 500,000 randomly-drawn maps. In this figure, districts are ordered by the number of votes a Democratic candidate for US Congress would have received in the 2020 election, had voters used “straight ticket” voting. On average, maps within our ensemble (blue dots) exhibit smoothly increasing vote shares as one moves from Republican-leaning to
Democratic-leaning districts. This smooth increase is the hallmark of an unbiased map. But in the proposed map (red dots), the increase is highly disjointed, a clear sign of gerrymandering.

We note several specific features of the proposed plan. First, Democratic voters are disproportionately removed from a swath of districts in between 10 and 15 (District numbers are along the x-axis) that would be competitive in an unbiased map (a process known as “cracking”), and placed into uncompetitive districts such as 32, 20, 29, 35, 18, and 33 (a process known as “packing”). Second, the list of outcomes between Districts 2 and 3 (a total of 13 districts) is very nearly flat, which is a hallmark of maps created with the assistance of computer algorithms designed to automate the gerrymandering process. Finally, the predicted vote share between Districts 15 and 7 changes abruptly by about 20 points, with only 2 districts in between (28 and 34) -- this represents a “wall” designed to protect legislators from changing voter opinions over time.

We also compute two common numbers that political scientists use to “score” maps. The first such number is called the “mean-median” score: the difference in statewide vote percentage each party would need to win the majority of the chamber. For the proposed map, the Republican Party would need to win only 42.25% of the vote to win 19 seats, while the Democratic Party would need to earn 57.75%; the difference of these numbers gives a “mean-median” score of 15.5 (note: to get these numbers from the figure, scale up by a factor of 100).

The second such score is called the “partisan bias” score: the difference in the number of seats each party wins if each were to earn 50% of the vote. For the proposed map, the Republican Party would win 24 seats with 50% of the vote, while the Democratic Party would win only 14 seats; the difference of these numbers gives a “partisan bias” score of –10.

Of course, no plan is going to be perfectly aligned with the ensemble, so just how gerrymandered is this plan? A little? A lot? An extreme amount? This question can be answered using statistics, by comparing each score above to the *distribution* of those scores within the 100,000-map ensemble. This is done in the figure below, and the results are
disappointing. As shown in the following figure, both the “mean-median” and “partisan bias” scores are very far from their typical values within an unbiased ensemble. In fact, both the mean-median and the partisan bias scores were more extreme than any value we saw in our ensemble. **Not a single map** in our ensemble had a mean-median score greater than that of the proposed map, and **not a single map** had a partisan bias score as negative. **We are currently generating a larger ensemble to validate these findings.**

We next consider C2102, C2103, C2104, and C2105, which were submitted by members of the public. As such, we are skeptical that they will be seriously considered by the committee. That would be unfortunate: because while all four plans appear to have been constructed to benefit the Democratic Party, they are all less manipulated than C2101.

We distinguish C2102, in particular. While its MM and PB scores are still on the flanks of their respective distributions, they are still less of an outlier than any of the other plans (with 3% of plans in the ensemble scoring “worse” -- i.e. more biased towards the Democratic Party -- on both scores). For context, the absolute largest mean-median value in our ensemble was 6.8, while the minimum partisan bias was –6; the scores for C2101, at 15.5 and –10 respectively, are completely off the scale.

We note that in C2102, the vote shares of individual districts are largely representative of the ensemble behavior; with the exception of District 36, all of the red dots lie between the 1%-99% percentiles of the blue “violins”. This contrasts with C2101, in which the red dots in the center of the district map seem to show no relationship with the typical values.
We briefly summarize all values in the following Table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan</th>
<th>Mean-median (MM)</th>
<th>MM percentile</th>
<th>Partisan Bias (PB)</th>
<th>PB percentile</th>
<th>Favors?</th>
<th>Less gerrymandered than...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ensemble</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2101</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>0 out of 100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2102</td>
<td>-8.6</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>90.0%</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>330 out of 100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2103</td>
<td>-8.3</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>99.91%</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>0 out of 100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2104</td>
<td>-10.0</td>
<td>0.51%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>98.6%</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>3 out of 100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2105</td>
<td>-9.9</td>
<td>0.54%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>98.6%</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>3 out of 100,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Update, October 2, 2021:

We note that at 100,000 maps, the medians of the ordered vote-share vectors are already well converged. However, the shapes and the ranges of the individual histograms may continue to shift slightly. Therefore to demonstrate robustness of our conclusions, we updated our ensemble to contain 500,000 maps, and the results are equally damning.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan</th>
<th>Mean-median (MM)</th>
<th>MM percentile</th>
<th>Partisan Bias (PB)</th>
<th>PB percentile</th>
<th>Favors?</th>
<th>Less gerrymandered than...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ensemble</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2101</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>0 out of 500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2102</td>
<td>-8.6</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>90.0%</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>1546 out of 500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2103</td>
<td>-8.3</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>99.91%</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>27 out of 500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2104</td>
<td>-10.0</td>
<td>0.51%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>98.6%</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>45 out of 500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2105</td>
<td>-9.9</td>
<td>0.54%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>98.6%</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>48 out of 500,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, the vote-share vector plot for C2101, with an updated ensemble, demonstrates that the pattern of extreme gerrymandering remains the same; the distributions of the ordered vote-shares have not shifted in any way that could conceivably explain the extreme pattern evidenced by the Republican-proposed map.