Date: 2021-09-28
First Name: Scott
Last Name: Norris
Title: Professor of Mathematics
Organization: Mathematicians for Unbiased Maps TX (MUM-TX)
Address: [redacted]
City: DALLAS
State: TX
Zipcode: [redacted]
Phone: [redacted]

Affirm public info: I agree

Regarding: Senate

Message:
See attached Word Document.

[attachment]
VRA Considerations for SB2101

Distribution of Democratic Voters vs. Ensemble

Although this document is primarily associated with distributions of voters along racial / ethnic lines (as ascertained from the 2020 Census), it is useful for reference to begin with an illustration of the proposed map’s distributions of voters along party lines (as ascertained from the 2020 Presidential Election). In the following figure, we present that distribution, with districts sorted according to Democratic voteshare, and we note that districts (17, 7, 2, 10, 9, 8, 12) all contain many fewer Democratic voters than would be expected from a map drawn at random from the ensemble (“cracking”) whereas districts (4, 22, 30, 18, 16, 15, 26, 29, 14, 23, 13) all contain many more Democratic voters than would be expected (“packing”). In short, SB2101 removes Democratic voters from competitive districts, and places them into non-competitive districts.

Distribution of Black / Hispanic Voters vs. Ensemble

In the next figure we present the same type of plot, but with districts sorted according to the fraction of of Black + Hispanic voters. We clearly observe the same type of trend as in the sorting by parties: districts (2, 22, 4, 11, 10, 7, 18, 31) all contain many fewer Black + Hispanic voters than would be expected from an unbiased map, whereas districts (16, 21, 26, 19, 23, 13, 20) all contain many more Black + Hispanic voters than would be expected. The story is
essentially identical to that observed above – SB2101 removes Black and Hispanic voters from districts where they form a near majority, and their voices might influence election outcomes, into districts where they already form a large majority.
Comparison of Political vs. Racial/Ethnic Gerrymandering

It is particularly noteworthy that the districts cracked / packed with Democratic voters significantly overlap those that are also cracked / packed with Black + Hispanic voters. In short, simply by comparing the district numbers in the two graphs above, we can see that

1. all but one of the 12 districts which appears to have constructed to lean Democratic has a minority population fraction above 55% (and 9/12 have a fraction above 65%)

2. every one of the 19 districts which appears to have been constructed to lean Republicans has a minority population fraction below 45% (and 18/19 have a fraction below 40%)

This correlation between political and racial / ethnic gerrymandering is seen even more dramatically if we plot each district according to its statistical deviation in minority population versus its statistical deviation in party affiliation. This is done in the following figure, where we observe that

- all but one of the 12 plans containing "too many" democratic voters also contain "too many" Black and Hispanic voters.
- all but one of the 19 plans containing "too few" democratic voters also contain "too few" Black and Hispanic voters.

We conclude with several interpretations.

1. SB2101 disproportionately removes Black + Hispanic voters from competitive districts where their voices might affect outcomes, and places them disproportionately into non-competitive districts where the outcomes are already all but guaranteed.
(2) As a result, SB201 creates several *several more* white-majority districts than statistically expected from an ensemble sample – despite forming only 41% of the population, non-Hispanic whites would form a majority in 19/31 senate districts.

(3) those resulting white-majority districts are *significantly more white* than would be expected statistically.